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In 2013, in a panel with Microsoft founder Bill Gates, vice chairman and the CEO of 
Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger, for Fox Business, the host 
asked the guests what was their opinion on Bitcoin. Charlie Munger quickly said he 
thought it was “rat poison”. Bill Gates called it a “technical tour de force”, although he 
stated that this is an area where governments will still going to maintain a dominant role. 
Finally, Warren Buffet said, and I quote, “I think either Charlie or Bill is right”1.  
This is a good way to illustrate how polarizing Virtual Currencies (hereinafter “VCs”) 
can be. It is hard to explain what a Virtual Currency (hereinafter “VC”) is. It is a hard of 
a concept to understand. It is as hard as explaining the Internet to the general public back 
at the time of its inception. Like the Internet in its early days, most people do not know 
exactly what a VC is and how it will impact society. At this point there are several 
different types of opinions and predictions: some praise the benefits of this new reality 
and speak of a revolution; others warn us of the dangers related to VCs and believe it is a 
trend soon to be dead. 
Perhaps in a few years we will talk about VCs as a small incident in the History of 
Technology, a curious experience of the early millennium. Or maybe we will look back 
at what is happening now as the beginning of a new technology that changed the way we 
do business in a deep way. But no matter what the future holds, this new technology is 
already having impact on the financial world today and creating difficulties and problems 
in business relationships. These difficulties and problems somehow need to be addressed 
from a legal perspective. 
Moreover the need to address the legal perspective is so urgent in two directions: the Law 
needs to respond to the innovations and trends arising from VCs; and, on the exact 
opposite direction, VCs will need to adjust quickly to the existing law and regulation in 
place. 
Needless to say, given the pace and speed of innovations in this area and the fluidity and 
freedom in which the virtual world operates, we are operating in an absolute ground zero 
in terms of academic or scientific research in this area. This space is so much virgin that 





one may wonder if there is really an academic interest in this topic. We claim this interest 
lies precisely in its novelty, but mostly in the potential to condition the future use, 
regulation and legislation of VCs or its derivatives. Any contribution made now has the 
potential (and the danger) to condition the future use of this novel means of payment. 
First and foremost, we need to understand this technology. Understanding it is in itself a 
daring and ambitious task and for lawyers that means going way out of their comfort 
zone. Disruptive technologies, like self-driving cars, VCs or artificial intelligence, as they 
leave the realm of science fiction into the real world are probably going to impose the 
biggest challenges to law in the coming decades of this century, so the sooner lawyers 
start to study these new realities, the better. 
The purpose of this work is provide an insight of the challenges that VCs impose upon 
the law, while documenting how some institutions and countries are already answering 
to them. We find situations in which the problems posed by these disruptive technologies 
are tackled and solutions are found. This paper does not aim to be a panegyric on the 
financial promised land of VCs or be an evangelizing defence of the inevitability and 
virtues of these technologies. Rather this dissertation takes a serious look on how 
regulation should approach these technologies and their current, future or simply potential 
widespread usage. To accomplish that we need set our research question: Where should 
regulation start in order to create a healthy environment for innovation, while 
protecting the traditional financial system and fight illegal activities? 
In section 2 we try to understand the concept of VC from a legal point of view. In section 
3 we will overview three pieces of work that we consider to be we the most relevant to 
understand the framework of VCs from a regulatory standpoint, namely, European 
Banking Authority’s Opinion on virtual currencies; United Kingdom Digital currencies: 
response to the call for information; and New York’s Bitlicense. Finally, in section 4 the 
description of the state of the art on the discussion about such a disruptive issue will 




2. What is Virtual Currency? 
a. Virtual Currency Schemes 
Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Darkcoin. These are all examples of different virtual 
currencies, more specifically cryptocurrencies2. Bitcoin is by far the most successful 
digital currency so far, “with more than 80% market capitalization”3. However, several 
other digital currencies may be found on the Internet. It is extremely difficult to determine 
the number of existing digital currencies. The website Crypto-Currency Market 
Capitalizations4, a website dedicated to show information on different cryptocurrencies, 
presently lists a total of seven hundred and eight (708) different cryptocurrencies. Some 
are more famous than others (like Bitcoin), most of them have little to no value. 
But what exactly is a VC? The use of the nomenclature “currency” certainly hints at the 
same definition as fiat currencies (hereinafter FC) like the Dollar or the Euro. However, 
presently there is still no clear legal definition for VC. 
The European Banking Authority defines virtual currencies as “a digital representation 
of value that is neither issued by a central bank or a public authority, nor necessarily 
attached to a Fiat Currency (FC), but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means 
of payment and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically.”5 
The European Central Bank (ECB) uses a more expansive definition. It states that “virtual 
currency can be defined as a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and 
usually controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a 
specific virtual community.”6  
This broader approach aims at including different types of “virtual currency schemes”, as 
follows: 
 Type 1 “closed virtual currency schemes”: these are  the VC used by some virtual 
communities without interaction with the “real economy” (in video games, for 
example);  
                                                          
2 “Cryptocurrency: virtual  currency  where all  relevant information is carried in encrypted form, e.g. in 
a blockchain” definition used by the European Parliament in Virtual currencies Challenges following 
their introduction, March 2016. 
3 European Parliament, Virtual currencies Challenges following their introduction; March 2016, cit. 
page 2. 
4 https://coinmarketcap.com, last consulted March 29, 2016. 
5 European Banking Authority, EBA Opinion on virtual currencies, 4 July 2014, cit. page 11. 
6 European Central Bank, Virtual Currency Schemes, October 2012, cit. page 5. 
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 Type 2 “virtual currency schemes with unidirectional flow”: these VC have 
conversion rates for purchasing virtual currency but not the other way around, and 
because of that, you can mostly only buy virtual goods and services; and  
 Type 3 “virtual currency schemes with bidirectional flow”: this category includes 
virtual currencies that can be converted to fiat currencies and vice versa. This last 
type is the most relevant, since it is the one that has more interaction with the real 
economy.  
The ECB’s definition covers an enormous range of VC schemes: prepaid value; loyalty 
points; monetization currencies; gaming currencies and value encoded currencies7. 
However, not all of these schemes are relevant for the purposes of this thesis. In fact, not 
all of the above schemes present the same regulation challenges. For the purposes of this 
thesis, we are going to focus only on the “value encoded currencies”. These are schemes 
that aim to replace cash8, or at least act as an alternative to FC. 
There are some examples of VC schemes that, due to their characteristics, have no 
relevance in terms of the new regulation challenges that this work will analyzes. 
Therefore, type 1 and 2 schemes will not be analyzed during this paper. Furthermore, not 
all type 3 schemes will be analyzed. 
Type 1 schemes are closed schemes (i.e., there is no trade outside the virtual community 
where such VCs were created). The same goes for type 2 schemes, which, despite the fact 
that VCs can be purchased with dollars or euros, there is no conversion from VC to FC. 
Therefore, these types of schemes do not aim at being an alternative payment system or 
act as currency, but rather facilitate the transaction in a certain virtual community or 
company (like the Nintendo Points or the extinct Facebook Credits). 
Likewise, some type 3 schemes may be created only to facilitate transaction within a 
virtual community or company. This is the case of the Linden Dollars (a virtual currency 
used in the videogame “Second Life” 9). Although VCs included in these schemes have 
bidirectional flow (meaning that there is an exchange rate that allows buying and selling 
such VCs), it is linked with the “Second Life” world. It only works between the members 
and inside that virtual world as a way to increase revenue for the company that manages 
                                                          
7 Selldahl Sara, Virtual currencies – Real opportunities? KTH Industrial Engineering and Management, 
2013. 
8 European Central Bank, Virtual Currency … cit. p. 6. 
9 Second Life is a virtual world where users create customized characters: http://secondlife.com/ 
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it. Any services and goods not related to the Second Life world cannot be bought with 
Linden Dollars. Again, it does not aim to act as an alternative payment system or as a real 
currency.  
There is a debate about which is the correct term to use when referring to this new 
phenomenon. For some, Virtual Currencies are, as ECB defines them, a broad concept 
that fits examples from companies loyalty points to prepaid cards or Bitcoins. Therefore 
the term “Digital Currencies” would prove to be a more specific term to designate the 
concept under analysis: the digital representation of value aimed at being used as a 
medium of exchange and therefore act as an alternative payment system.  
Coin Center, a “non-profit research and advocacy center focused on the public policy 
issues facing cryptocurrency technologies such as Bitcoin”10, claims that “Virtual 
currency could refer to any sort of non-tangible currency, e.g., dollars sent through 
Paypal or airline miles. Digital, by contrast, makes clear that newer electronically 
tokenized money is what is at issue.”11 
Despite the fact that the distinction between virtual and digital currencies can help a better 
understanding of both phenomena, the general public does not fully grasp the distinction 
(that also includes regulatory agencies). The most notable example is probably the New 
York State’s Department of Financial Services (NYSDFS). This department defines VC 
as “any type of digital unit that is used as a medium of exchange or a form of digitally 
stored value. Virtual Currency shall be broadly construed to include digital units of 
exchange that (i) have a centralized repository or administrator; (ii) are decentralized 
and have no centralized repository or administrator; or (iii) may be created or obtained 
by computing or manufacturing effort. Virtual Currency shall not be constructed to 
include any of the following: 
1. Digital units that (i) are used solely within online gaming platforms, (ii) have no 
market or application outside of those gaming platforms, (iii) cannot be 
converted into, or redeemed for, Fiat Currency or Virtual Currency, and (iv) may 
or may not be redeemable for real-world goods, services, discounts, or 
purchases. 
                                                          
10 https://coincenter.org/about/ 
11 Van Valkenburg, Peter and Brito, Jerry, State Digital Currency Principles and Framework, April 2015 
Coin Center Report, version 1.0, cit. page 4. 
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2. Digital units that can be redeemed for goods, services, discount, or purchases 
part of a customer affinity or rewards program with the issuer and/or other 
designated merchants or can be redeemed for digital units another customer 
affinity or rewards program, but cannot be converted into, or redeemed for, Fiat 
Currency or Virtual Currency; or 
3. Digital units used as part of Prepaid Cards.”12 
This regulatory agency uses the term Virtual Currency but defines it the same way the 
Coin Center and others define Digital Currency. 
Considering the above, it feels like arguing in favor of any of the terms analyzed herein 
might be a lost cause. Instead, we should acknowledge that both expressions exist: 
“digital currency” is a more narrow definition, meaning the newer generation of digital 
representation of value that aims to act as a payment system (like Bitcoin); and “virtual 
currency” can either be used lato sensu to mean every digital representation of value 
(from prepaid cards to company loyalty points), or stricto sensu, having the same meaning 
as the “digital” term. 
 
b. Virtual Currencies vs Electronic Money (E-money) 
The concept of electronic money, or simply e-money, can easily be confused with VC. 
The European Union defines it as “electronically, including magnetically, stored 
monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds 
for the purpose of making payment transactions as defined in point 5 of Article 4 of the 
Directive 2007/64/EC, and which is accepted by a natural or legal person other than the 
electronic money issuer.”13 The ECB explains that, even if VC may meet some of the 
criteria established by this definition, there is a fundamental difference: “In electronic 
money schemes the link between the electronic money and the traditional money format 
is preserved and has a legal foundation, as the stored funds are expressed in the same 
                                                          
12 New York State Department of Financial Services, Title 23 Chapter I, Regulations of the 
Superintendent of Financial Services, Part 200 Virtual Currencies, cit. pages 5 and 6. 
13 Article 2 n.º2 of Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 




unit of account (e.g. US dollars, euros, etc.). In virtual currency schemes, the unit of 
account is changed into a virtual one (e.g. Linden Dollars, Bitcoins)”14.  
E-money is not a different unit of account, but rather the digital representation of a FC. 
Contrary to VC, there are no conversion rates since the unit of account is still the FC that 
represents. 
c. Bitcoin 
Although some types of virtual currency can be tracked as far as the late 1990’s 15, only 
in very recently years have they got the attention from the general public and from public 
institutions. This is largely due to the success of Bitcoin.  
Therefore, understanding what Bitcoin is becomes imperative to understand VCs in 
general. 
Bitcoin is a VC created by Satoshi Nakamoto, (a pseudonym used by the real creator16) 
in 200817. There are several different definitions of this VC on websites and articles all 
over the Internet. However, one of the best definitions is the one provided by the United 
States Government Accountability Office on their report, “Virtual Currencies Emerging 
Regulatory, Law Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges” 18. As stated on 
said report, “The bitcoin computer protocol permits the storage of unique digital 
representation of value (bitcoins) and facilitates the assignment of bitcoins from one user 
to another through a peer-to-peer, Internet-based network”19. It further adds that “users’ 
bitcoin balances are associated with bitcoin address (long strings of numbers and letters) 
that use principles of cryptography to help safeguard against inappropriate tampering 
with bitcoin transactions and balances. When users transfer bitcoins, the recipient 
provides their bitcoin address to the sender, and the sender authorizes the transaction 
with their private key (essentially a secret code that proves the sender’s control over their 
bitcoin address). Bitcoin transactions are irrevocable and do not require the sender or 
receiver to disclose their identities to each other or a third party. However, each 
                                                          
14 European Central Bank, Virtual Currency … cit. page 16 
15 E-Gold in 1996 and Flooz in 1999 were early examples of virtual currencies. 
16 The true identity of the creator or creators of Bitcoin is unknown. 
17 Satoshi Nakamoto published the paper entitled Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System in 
November of 2008, however only in 2009 the Bitcoin software client was released. 
18 United States Government Accountability Office, Virtual Currencies Emerging Regulatory Law 
Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges, May 2014. 
19 Idem., cit. page 5. 
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transaction is registered in a public ledger called the “blockchain”, which maintains the 
associated bitcoin addresses and transaction dates, times, and amounts.”20  
Regarding the creation process, the United States Government Accountability Office also 
states that, “Bitcoins are created and entered into circulation through a process called 
mining. Bitcoin miners download free software that they use to solve complex math 
problems. Solving these problems verifies the validity of bitcoin transactions by grouping 
several transactions into a block and mathematically proving that the transactions 
occurred and did not involve double spending of a bitcoin.”21 
This a complex definition. In order to fully grasp all the elements included therein, it is 
useful to analyze its main features: (i) unique digital representation of value; (ii) creation 
of bitcoins and validation of transaction is made through a Peer-to-Peer process called 
“mining”; (iii) anonymity of the participants vs Publicity of transaction in the “block 
chain”; (iv) decentralized currency, cryptography replaces trust; (v) it does not have the 
status of legal tender. 
(i) Unique digital representation of value 
Bitcoins, like any other VC, are a digital representation of value. However, this 
representation is not linked to any commodity or economic activity, it has no specific 
practical use or utility, which means it has no intrinsic value or worth. This characteristic 
is the main reason for this digital currency’s volatility so far. Bitcoin’s value/price is 
solely linked to market fundamentals such as supply and demand, attractiveness for 
investors, and development of global financial indicators22. Two of these factors, supply 
and demand and attractiveness of investors, are extremely influenced by information. 
Being a very new financial innovation, it is difficult for users and investors to be well-
informed. This volatility behaves like a speculative bubble and “overoptimistic media 
coverage of Bitcoin prompts waves of novice investors to pump up Bitcoin prices. The 
exuberance reaches a tipping point, and the value eventually plummets.”23 
                                                          
20 Idem., cit. page 6. 
21 Idem., cit. page 7. 
22 Ciaian, Pavel; Rajcaniova, Miroslava; Kancs, d’Artis, The Economics of Bitcoin price formation, EERI 
Research paper series, Nº 8, 2014, cit. page 12. 
23 Brito Jerry and Castillo Andrea, Bitcoin A Primer for Policymakers, 2013, Mercatus Center at George 
Mason University, cit. page 17. 
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In a sense the fluctuations of Bitcoin values are similar to any other national currency, 
with the difference that there is no underlying economy or monetary authority behind this 
particular currency. Hence, the economic fluctuations are in some sense freer than the 
ones of even the most volatile national currency, whose trends will depend on the trends 
of the underlying economy and the actions of the monetary authority, usually a national 
central bank relative to those of the other national currencies. 
(ii) Creation of bitcoins and validation of transaction is made through a Peer-
to-Peer process called “mining” 
The “mining process” is the means through which VCs are created. By downloading and 
installing specific software, users’ computers get access to the Bitcoin network, and lend 
some of its resources (mainly the processor) to the said network. The mining process is 
the one that takes place when the “miners” computers solve complex math problems that 
allow the verification of transactions. The miner is rewarded with fresh created Bitcoins 
for their contribution to the network. These “miners” substitute the role of the financial 
clear house, and are the ones that confirm the veracity of all transaction and prevent fraud. 
This mining process is built with a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) arquithecture. Without entering 
into technical details, P2P works in a way of distributing the load of a task by the 
members/users of that network. That task can consist of different things, file sharing being 
maybe the most famous example or, in the case of Bitcoin, validation of transaction by 
solving complex mathematical problems. Every transaction takes ten minutes up to over 
two hours to be verified, but on average takes an hour24. 
So, the mining process have two outcomes: transaction validation and creation of new 
bitcoins. It is this process that protects the system’s integrity. 
(iii) Anonymity of the participants vs Publicity of transaction in the “block 
chain” 
After the transactions are authenticated and validated, they are pressed in blocks and 
submitted to a public record called Blockchain. Every transaction ever made with bitcoins 
is registered in this blockchain, and everyone has access to it. This is how miners can 
                                                          
24 Bonneau, Joseph, How long does it take for a Bitcoin transaction to be Confirmed, Coin Center, 
November 3, 2015. 
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authenticate transactions: by having access to the database of all transactions ever made 
and making sure that the user is not “double spending” their bitcoins. 
This transparent publicity of transactions contrasts with the users’ anonymity. The 
blockchain only holds information about the transaction, specifically the public key of 
the sender and receiver, the amount traded and the date. This means that there is no need 
for users’ personal information to be disclosed. Users are identified by an anonymous key 
(since it is not connected to any personal information) and this is the only piece of 
information that is published in the blockchain. However, this does not mean that 
anonymity is totally granted. Some authors25 have called it a pseudo-anonymity. This is 
so, because, technically, through sophisticated network analytic techniques, it is possible 
to track down and identify individual users26.  
One may still argue that this pseudo-anonymity still difficult regulatory supervision, 
however this is not a complete new challenge for States supervisors. In some States, bank 
secrecy rules impose a real challenge for authorities to investigate customers’ 
information27. In the case of VCs, it is not the law that protects the secrecy of the users or 
customers, rather the network architecture. Therefore is not in the hands of a judge to 
impose disclosure, but on the technical capacities of the authority. 
(iv) Decentralized currency. Cryptography replaces trust 
After understanding how Bitcoin works, it is clear that this is a decentralized VC. On its 
paper, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Satoshi Nakamoto makes it clear 
from the beginning that the elimination of third parties is the main goal: “What is needed 
is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing 
any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted 
third party”28. The system is built so that there is no need for a third party acting as an 
intermediary. The main objective is the replacement of trust on central banks or other 
financial institutions for a cryptographic system that accomplishes the same functions. 
For this reason, all decentralized VCs created up to this date are cryptocurrencies. 
                                                          
25 Idem., cit. page 1 and  Doguet, J. Joshua, The nature of the form: Legal and regulatory issues 
surrounding the bitcoin digital currency system, Louisiana Law Review, volume 73, number 4, 2013, cit. 
page 1130.  
26 Doguet, J. Joshua, The nature of the form: Legal and regulatory issues surrounding the bitcoin digital 
currency system, Louisiana Law Review, volume 73, number 4, 2013, cit. page 1129. 
27 One famous example being the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks from Switzerland. 
28 Nakamoto, Satoshi. Bitcoin: A peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 2008 cit. page 1. 
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Opposite to these, are the centralized currencies, which have a central node or 
administrator controlling it. In this type of VC scheme, the central entity, which can be a 
company or anyone that creates the VC, does the work of the traditional financial 
intermediaries or monetary authority; it is the one in charge of creating currency and 
avoiding the double spending by validating any transaction, acting as financial clear-
house. 
(v) It is not legal tender 
Finally, Bitcoin, like any other VC out there, is not legal tender. As EBA states, this 
means that VC do not have “(a) mandatory acceptance, i.e., that the creditor of a payment 
obligation cannot refuse currency unless the parties have agreed on other means of 
payment; (b) acceptance at full face value, i.e., the monetary value is equal to the amount 
indicated; and (c) that the currency has the power to discharge debtors form their 
payment obligations.”29 However, as EBA also recognizes30, this feature can change. 
Although unlikely to happen in an immediate future, all it takes for this to change is for 
any country to declare legal tender on a VC. 
Different VC can have different characteristics; however, the network effect, or the 
network externality, impact deeply the value of VC, and this makes Bitcoin extremely 
influential in comparison to other VC. The concept of network externality tells us that a 
value of a good or service grows as more people have or use it. In case of VC, this is 
especially relevant because, not having legal tender, the more people use it the easier it is 
to spend them. Sooner or later one VC will have such a wide acceptance as a means of 
payment. At that point regulation of VC will be obvious. The question we raise is whether 
or not the path of a VC to that wide acceptance should be allowed to happen without any 
supervision or regulation. To this date Bitcoin is the one VC getting closer to that status. 
So, it is imperative for every authority that aims at regulating VC to take it into account. 
 
d. Is Virtual Currency really a currency? 
Law-makers are very careful with the names they choose. Everything must be precise, 
and with every name comes numerous conclusions about the thing named. From Digital 
                                                          
29 European Banking Authority, Opinion on… cit. page 13. 
30 Idem, cit. page 13. 
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Currencies to VC or even Crypto Currency, it is clear that it was not a lawyer that chose 
those names for these new phenomenon, although said designations have been widely 
accepted by the general public. 
Just because it is referred to as VC it does not automatically turns it into a currency. VC 
still needs to prove itself worthy.  
FC has three main functions31:  
 It serves as a medium of exchange;  
 It is a unit of account and measure of relative worth; and 
 It acts as a store of value of current earnings for future spending.  
Although VC have the potential to accomplish these functions, currently there are some 
limitations that do not allow them to perform as FC.  
Firstly, because VCs are not legal tender, which means that they are not universally 
accepted, and they only serve as a mean of exchange if the merchant is willing to accept 
them as payment. FC also has no intrinsic value. However, it is used as money by fiat 
(decree) of the government. Since VCs are decentralized currencies, no government or 
authority backs such currencies. In this regard, VCs are closer to commodities.  
Secondly, for the case of being a unit of account and measure, the large majority of 
merchants that trade with bitcoin still tag their price in a FC (like the dollar)32. They do 
not hold bitcoins. To avoid bearing the risk of this VC volatility, they use the services of 
a third party, an exchange platform33. When a customer pays in bitcoins, this third party 
accepts the bitcoins at the current exchange rate and deposits the corresponding amount 
in FC in the merchant account34 (although there are already a few exceptions, websites 
pricing their goods/services in bitcoins35). As such, mostly, Bitcoin and other VC exist in 
the market correlated to a FC. Ultimately, this means that FC is a common measure of 
value, whereas VCs are not, especially due to their volatility.  
                                                          
31 Thomas P. Fitch, Dictionary of Banking Terms 391 (1990); Education Policy & Development, 
American Bankers Association, Banking Terminology 231 (3d ed. 1989). 
32 See for example “Bitcoin for Vinyl”: http://www.bitcoinforvinyl.com/  
33 Like Coinbase for example: https://www.coinbase.com/ 
34 Brito, Jerry and Shadab, Houman B. and Castillo, Andrea, Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, 
Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling (January 15, 2015). Columbia Science and Technology 
Law Review (2014), cit. page 157. 
35 See for example: https://btctrip.com/ an flight and hotel booking site that price their service in Bitcoin. 
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Thirdly, VCs current high volatility keeps them from acting as a valid measure of worth 
and a store of value. To act as a store of value, a currency has to be stable to offer its 
owners the safety of knowing that they will still have something of value in the future 
when they decide to spend it. With VC there is the risk of their value collapse. There is 
no Central Bank or any other Financial Institution to ensure the integrity and continuity 
of the VC, therefore, their value and, ultimately, their existence relies on their user base. 
So, anyone that chooses to have VC must bear in mind that in the future they may be 
worth nothing. 
In conclusion, although VCs share a lot with FC, they do not fully accomplish the main 
functions of said currencies. Therefore VCs should not be considered as a “Currency”. 
However, we must realize that this reality can change tomorrow.  
As stated above, although unlikely in a near future, a country can declare a VC legal 
tender. On the other hand, the user base can grow so much to a point that having a Bitcoin 
wallet (or other VC) is as common as having an email address or a Facebook account, 
making VC a regular medium of exchange and a clear alternative to FC.  
The current high volatility may fade away as VC matures and people’s understanding of 
this new phenomenon grows. If the value of a VC (most likely, Bitcoin) stabilizes, that 
means that they can fully act as a store of value of current earnings for future spending. 
In the same way, if the user base grows strong, if merchants that accept VC become more 
usual and if its value becomes more stable, it is easy to foresee more and more sites pricing 
their goods and services solo or also in Bitcoin. Especially, the sites that offer exclusive 
Internet services (like file sharing, music stream or programming services) may see in VC 
a way of globally pricing their services in the market. This can lead to VC becoming a 
truly unit of account and measure of relative worth. 
Still in this subject matter, ECB states on its report on VC schemes that “Money is a social 
institution: a tool created and marked by society’s evolution, which has exhibited a great 
capacity to evolve and adapt to the character of the times. It is not surprising that money 
has been affected by recent technological developments and especially by the widespread 
use of the Internet.”36 This points out the fact that “Money” is an evolving concept that 
has been changing, adapting itself to technological advances. In the future, VC can evolve 
                                                          
36 European Central Bank, Virtual Currency…, cit. page 10. 
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into fully accomplish the functions of a currency but also, in their uniqueness, they can 
make that concept evolve into something slightly different, to accommodate new realities. 
This, however, is something that we can only speculate about, since we have to wait and 
see how things will turn out. For now, we have to work with what we have. 
Although we subscribe the conclusion that VCs are not real currencies, we, like the 
EBA37, find no need to rename this phenomenon. The discussion between names (Virtual 
currency vs Digital Currency) is one with no real value, misses all the question and 
problems behind this reality. This paper does not aim at renaming VC into something less 
misleading, since that term is already the common public denomination. Let’s spare us 
from an unnecessary onomastic crusade.  
Though we state that Virtual Currencies are not a currency, it does not mean they do not 
fall within the scope of action of the central banks, namely the European Central Bank. 
The potential to accomplish all the main functions of a currency, and the fact that their 
main goal is to achieve an alternative way of payment are enough to put VC within central 
bank responsibilities. The same position is stated by ECB on its 2012 report Virtual 
Currency Schemes: “… virtual currencies: (…) do indeed fall within central banks’ 
responsibilities as a result of characteristics shared with payment systems, which give 
rise to the need for at least an examination of developments and the provision of an initial 
assessment”.38 
 
e. VC and Financial Instruments 
Bitcoin (and the others VCs created afterwards and inspired by it) was created to be an 
alternative payment system. There is no doubt about that since the paper from Satoshi 
Nakamoto is called “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” and its protocol is 
largely dedicated to transaction, as stated in the paper, “We have proposed a system for 
electronic transactions without relying on trust” 39. However, its large volatility, that we 
already mentioned, made it popular for speculators40. After its increase in value in 2011, 
                                                          
37 Idem. cit. page 11. 
38 Idem. cit. page 6. 
39 Nakamoto, Satoshi. Bitcoin: … cit. page 8. 
40 See e.g., James Surowiecki, Cryptocurrency: The Bitcoin, a virtual medium of exchange could be a real 
alternative to government-issued money – but only if it survives hoarding by Speculators, 114 MIT Tech 
Review, 106, 2006. 
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there was a rush to buy bitcoins and not to spend them in services or goods but to 
speculate. Bitcoin is still seen, by many users, as an investment to make profit out of its 
value fluctuation and not as an alternative payment system41. 
The concept of financial instrument is a difficult one to pinpoint for law due to its recent 
existence and innovative nature. There is no clear legal definition and this concept is 
changing constantly due to the growing financial innovation of the past years42. VC can 
well be just a new chapter in the history of financial instruments. 
Financial instruments can be divided in three categories: securities; derivatives and 
money-market instruments. Because of the speculative nature, one may argue that VC fits 
the concept of derivatives. It is true that one of the main functions of derivatives is indeed 
speculation (being the other three hedging, asset liability management and arbitrage43). 
Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference between VC and derivatives. A derivative 
is a contract referring to an underlying asset. “A financial derivative is a financial 
instrument based on another basic instrument, which value depends on it”44.  
As we stated above, VCs are not linked to any underlying asset or economic activity. 
Therefore, they fail to achieve all the features needed to fit a more familiar concept. VC 
are not, per se, a financial instrument. 
Despite this, there are already financial instrument being indexed to VC (mainly to 
Bitcoin). These financial instruments raise some questions and legal problems on their 
one. Most importantly: does the use of VC as an underlying asset of financial instrumental 
demands extra regulation to deal with specification of this type of investment?  
On this topic, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), on its call for 
evidence in 2015, stated that while monitoring this type of investment, does not have no 
plans to take further regulatory measures45. In this work, ESMA analyzed the three main 
types of investment using VC: (i) “Investment products which have virtual currency as 
                                                          
41 Lee, Timothy (2013), Bitcoin Is A Bad Currency But It Might Be A Good Platform For Financial 
Innovation, Forbes, April 1. 
42 Antunes, J. Engrácia, Os instrumentos Financeiros, 2009, Almedina cit. page 22. 
43 Hudson, Alastair, The Law on Financial Derivatives, 2 edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998 
44 Kolb, Robert; Overdahl, James, Financial Derivatives, 1, 3 edition, J. Wiley & Sons, 2002 
45 European Securities and Market Authority, Call for evidence, Investment using virtual currency or 
distributed ledger technology, 22 April 2015, cit. page 6. 
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an underlying”; (ii) “Investment in virtual currency based assets/securities” and (iii) 
“Other uses of the distributed ledger in relation to investment”46.  
Also on this topic, Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab, and Andrea47 make the case that the next 
wave of regulation will be VC based financial instrument (being New York’s Bitlicense, 
that we further going to analyze, an example of the first wave of regulation). These 
authors divide those who seek VC, more specifically Bitcoin, based financial instruments, 
into two categories: those who seek hedge against Bitcoin’s volatility, therefore using 
Bitcoin Derivatives (like Futures, Forwards, Swaps and Options), and those who seek to 
speculate on its price, using Bitcoin securities (like Bitcoin funds and Bitcoin margin 
trading). The authors of this paper argue that “financial regulator should consider 
exempting or excluding certain financial transactions denominated in Bitcoin from the 
full scope of the regulations, much like private securities offerings and forward contracts 
are treated”. This statement alone, as well as the regulation of financial instruments based 
on VC, are a thesis topic on their own. Therefore, although interesting, we are going to 
leave this topic for other time. 
 
f. Towards a definition 
VCs are very disruptive and highly innovative technology. As a consequence, it is very 
difficult to fit this new technology into our old concepts and definitions. It is futile to 
force it. They sit in a grey area, in between familiar concepts, refusing to obey our demand 
for clarity. 
Therefore, we should find a definition that is broad enough to let VC evolve. It is our 
opinion that EBA provided the best definition: 
“VCs are a digital representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank or a 
public authority, nor necessarily attached to a Fiat Currency, but is accepted by natural 
or legal persons as a means of payment and can be transferred, stored or traded 
electronically.”48 
                                                          
46  Idem., cit. page 7. 
47 Brito, Jerry and Shadab, Houman B. and Castillo, Andrea, Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, 
Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling (January 15, 2015). Columbia Science and Technology 
Law Review (2014), cit. pages 144-220. 
48 European Banking Authority, Opinion on… cit. page 7. 
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It does not define it as being a currency but it does not also exclude it; instead, it focus on 
the “digital representation of value”. Secondly, it underlines its private nature, as they are 
not linked to any State. Consequently, people (natural or legal) only accept them if they 





3. Regulating Virtual Currencies: where to begin? 
Being a disruptive technology and a financial innovation, VCs impose difficult challenges 
to law. Financial regulators all over the world are faced with a fast growing reality that 
has the ability to change, or at least to have a meaningful impact on e-commerce, which 
means these institutions need to prepare themselves to deal with it. The fast growth of VC 
can be linked to a general lack of faith in the traditional financial system, especially after 
the international financial crisis. An example that illustrates this statement is the positive 
impact that the Cyprus crisis and bailout had on the price of bitcoin in 201349. 
How can one regulate something that does not suit our legal concepts? It claims to be a 
currency, but it is not quite. It behaves somehow as a financial instrument, but it is not 
quite. The deeply complex technical aspect of VCs (their protocol, the blockchain) also 
presents a challenge for regulators.  
Three main groups of regulatory problems arise from VC: 
 Consumer protection; 
 Anti-Money laundry (AML); 
 Tax policy. 
Although it is undoubtedly relevant, tax policy is excluded from the scope of this work. 
Our research question does not aim at finding how states should tax VC’s gains. That is 
a problem which deserves attention on its own, for its particularities50. However, we have 
to make a remark to highlight the quickness of authorities around the world to frame VCs’ 
gains for taxation purposes. 
Terrorism financing using VCs, although a relevant subject, is also left out of the scope 
of this work. Though we are aware that any regulation with Anti-Money Laundering goals 
(and we will debate AML measures further on this work) will help fight terrorism 
financing, we think this is a more complex subject involving specific factors that we do 
not have the time or the knowledge to tackle on this thesis. 
                                                          
49 Farrel, Maurreen (2013), Bitcoin Prices surge post-Cyrprus bailout, CNN Money, March 28. 
50 For further information on this topic we advise: Bal, Aleksandra Marta, Taxation of Virtual Currency, 
PhD Thesis, Universiteit Leiden, 2014. 
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So we are left with our research question: Where should regulation start in order to create 
a healthy environment for innovation, while protecting the traditional financial system 
and suppress illegal activities? 
To answer this question we must first take an insight on what international institutions 
and states around the world are already producing concerning VCs In order to do so, three 
documens were chosen, due to their current relevance on the field: “EBA Opinion on 
‘virtual currencies’”, UK government’s “Digital currencies: response to the call for 
information” and New York state Department of Financial Services’ “BitLicense”. 
 
a. European Banking Authority 
In 2014, EBA made a comprehensive study on the regulatory challenges of VCs. On this 
report, after analyzing the definition of VC, that has already proven itself useful for this 
work, EBA goes on to list the market participants that are “more probable addressees for 
regulation”51. This list includes: 
1. Users; 
2. Merchants; 
3. Scheme governance authorities (only existing on centralize VCs); 
4. Exchange; 
5. Trade platforms; 
6. Processing service providers; 
7. Wallet providers/custodians; 
8. Inventors; 
9. Technical Service providers; 
10. Information providers; 
11. Miners. 
From this list we highlight the miners because of their essential role on decentralized VCs 
as we found out in the second chapter. Additionally, the role of exchanges, trade 
platforms, processing service providers and wallet providers/ custodians most be 
highlighted because, in spite of not being essential to the system, meaning they do not 
have a core function for the scheme to work, they have an important role making it more 
                                                          
51 European Banking Authority, EBA Opinion on … cit. pages 13 to 14 
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efficient. Without them we would still have Bitcoin and other VCs; however they create 
an appropriate environment for them to growth. 
Exchanges and Trade platforms bring liquidity to VCs helping them being exchanged for 
FCs or other VCs and being able to trade them for goods. Processing services providers 
help merchants who price their goods/services in an FC by receiving the equivalent 
amount in VC and immediately exchange it for FC, holding, therefore, the exchange rate 
risk. Lastly, wallet providers/custodians store VCs of its users on an online account, 
offering extra security. 
Hereupon, EBA goes on to analyze the benefits and risks associated with VC. 
Benefits: 
EBA divides potential benefits” into “economic benefits” and “individual benefits”. 
The first group includes: transaction costs; transaction processing time; certainty of 
payments received; contribution to economic growth and financial inclusion outside the 
EU.  
Lower transactions costs are widely regarded, inside the community and for authorities 
that study VC, as one of the biggest benefits. A few notes should be made on this matter. 
As EBA states, the absence of intermediaries makes the transaction costs much lower 
than those of the traditional financial system. Looking at Bitcoin as an example, 
transaction costs can be less than 0.0005 BTC, or around 1% of the amount transacted52. 
Another benefit is that these costs do not diverse depending on the geographical position 
of the parts. These lower numbers make micropayments viable, a not very-well explored 
financial land. However, when third parties are involved (like trading platform, payment 
service providers or even e-wallets) they can claim fees for themselves. With the 
possibility of these parties being regulated, compliance costs will arise, making it also 
possible the raise of the VC overall transaction cost.  
There is also the question of the miners demanding higher fees so that the mining process 
keeps profitable. EBA explores the possibility stating “it is therefore reasonable to 
assume that transaction fees will increase in the future”53. Although it is a possibility, it 
                                                          
52 The fees go to the miners as an incentive. The rules of when or how much the fees cost are built into 
the network protocol and are related with the size of the transaction in bytes and the age of the coin spend. 
For more technical information go to: http://bitcoinfees.com/ 
53 European Banking Authority, EBA Opinion on … cit. page 17 
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can be trickier than EBA makes it seem, because a change to miners fees needs to be 
made into the VC protocol itself (it would not occur naturally) and the threshold where 
the current fees stop being profitable for miners can take more than a decade to reach, and 
if the transaction grows fast enough, that threshold will probably never be reached54. 
Transaction processing time refers to the fact that, no matter where the parts are located 
and at what time the transaction is made, it take somewhere from  ten to over two hours, 
but on average it will take about an hour55, meaning it takes that time for a new block to 
be added into the blockchain. The network works 24/7, since the servers are around the 
world are constantly processing new transactions. 
Certainty of payments received points to the fact that transactions of decentralized VC 
are irrevocable. This can be seen as beneficial for merchants who can then avoid charge 
backs and credit card fraud schemes. On the other hand, consumers may be overexposed 
to error or frauds of merchants. As Brito and Castillo point out “those who want the 
protection and perks of using a credit card can continue to do so, even if they pay a little 
more. Those who are more price – or privacy – conscious can use bitcoins instead.”56 
Contributing to economic growth relates to stimulation for financial innovation, and 
growth of business like the trading and exchange platform, but also in the hardware sector 
that specializes in mining. In this economic growth we should also include the potential 
within the blockchain. This technology is already being studied for others application 
than just a ledger57. 
Financial inclusion outside the EU, or as Brito and Castilho call it “potential to combat 
poverty and oppression”, refers to the positive impact that VC can have in the parts of the 
globe where people do not have access to basic financial services. 
Under the “individual benefits” EBA includes security of personal data and limited 
interference by public authorities. 
                                                          
54 Wagner, A. (2014), Don’t Raise Bitcoin Transaction Fees, BitcoinMagazine, July, 16. 
55 Bonneau, Joseph. “How long does it take for a Bitcoin transaction to be confirmed?” Coin Center 2015. 
56 Brito, Jerry e Andrea Castillo. Bitcoim, A Prime for Policymakers. Mercatus Center, George Mason 
University, 2013, page 13. 
57 This includes smart contracts, where the conditions and outcomes are encoded in the contract; smart 
property, a way to replace the public record of home ownership, for a record based on blockchain 
technology. Too see more on this subject: http://www.wired.com/2015/01/block-chain-2-0/ 
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The increased security of personal data is a consequence of the anonymity factor already 
analyzed in the last chapter58. 
The Limited interference by public authorities is especially relevant for people who 
believe that governments and central banks are unworthy of the power over currency. One 
may argue, as a consequence, that a currency which is independent of any state power, 
and is attached only to market force is a stronger currency. 
Risks 
EBA also listed the potential risks of virtual currencies, which are summarised in table 
one.  
With this EBA list of risks, we close the chapter on benefits and move on to a thorough 
risk analyze of VC under the name “Risks, and their casual drivers”. In the present work, 
there is not enough room to go over all the seventy risks identified, so we going to focus 
more on the risks drives. The following table59 is presented by EBA to summarize the 
subject: 
#  Driver of risks  
 
a  VC schemes can be created (and their functioning subsequently changed) by 
anyone, anonymously: Anyone can anonymously create a VC and can 
subsequently make changes to the VC protocol or other core components if the 
required majority of (anonymous) miners agree.  
b  Payer and payee are anonymous: Transmitters and recipients of VCs interact 
on a person-to-person basis but remain anonymous.  
c  Global reach: the internet-based nature of VC schemes does not respect national 
and, therefore, jurisdictional boundaries  
d  Lack of probity: exchange is neither audited nor subject to governance and 
probity standards, and is subject to misappropriation, fraud and seizure  
e  Not a legal person: market participants are not incorporated as entities that could 
be subjected to standards  
f  Opaque price formation: price formation on exchanges is not transparent and is 
not subject to reliable standards, and exchange rates differ significantly between 
exchanges, which facilitates manipulation of exchanges  
g  No refunds or payment guarantee: VC transactions are not reversible, so no 
refunds are issued for erroneous transactions  
                                                          
58 Chapter 2 c. Bitcoin 
59 One of the columns was omitted because it refers to letters and numbers for each risk, and so have no 
relevancy for us. To check the full table see page 38 EBA Opinion on virtual currencies. 
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h  Unclear regulation: the regulatory treatment is unclear and creates uncertainty 
for market participants  
I  Lack of definitions and standards: the features of a product can be 
misrepresented because of a lack of definitions and standards  
j  Inadequate IT safety: the IT systems, infrastructure, transaction ledger, VC 
protocol and encryption are either insecure, subject to fraud and manipulation, 
and, in the case of the protocol, can be changed through a majority of minders  
k  Information is neither objective nor equally distributed: limited availability 
of comprehensible, independent and objective information on VC activities. As a 
result, some market participants benefit from information inequality, e.g. on 
events that influence price formation  
l  Insufficient funds or VC units: market participants have insufficient funds to 
meet financial obligations or to compensate creditors in the case of bankruptcy  
m  No separation of accounts: VC units temporarily held at an exchange are often 
not segregated from the exchange, i.e. held in client accounts  
n  No complaint process: no effective channel for users to complain  
o  Lack of access to redress: no access to redress, compensation or protection 
schemes  
p  Lack of corporate capacity and governance: lack of skills, expertise, systems , 
controls, organizational structure and governance exercised by market 
participants  
q  No reporting: lack of reporting requirements to any authority, e.g. of suspicious 
transactions  
r  Interconnectedness to FC: VC units and FC funds can be exchanged easily, 
therefore creating spill-over effects or risks from VC to FC systems  
s  Not legal tender: merchants are not legally required to accept a particular (or 
any) VC and can switch between different VC schemes  
t  No stabilizing authority: no authority that could provide exchange rate stability 
and/or act as the redeemer of last resort  
 
A few notes on some of these drivers of risk. Any regulatory attempt of VCs need to 
address these issues, so any regulator needs to understand this table in order to be 
successful. 
Understanding the risks of VCs is essential to create adequate and effective regulation. 
Due to time and space constraints, this thesis cannot analyse all the above mentioned risks 
in detail but we will focus on some of the drivers of risk as a basis to ascertain some 
essential elements of the regulation of VCs.  
Driver (a) is especially relevant for centralizing VC, where the creator or the entity that 
oversees the currency (if different) will have the power to change the protocol. With 
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decentralized VC it’s harder to change the protocol because even if the updates are made 
by the same individual or group of individuals, as the Coin Center explains, “this network, 
composed as it will be of independent, technologically-sophisticated users, will audit the 
new code and likely reject any code that attempts to inject risk or fraud into the system.”60 
Since the protocol of decentralized VC is open source, everyone can “audit” any changes. 
The network of users acts, once again, as the guardian of the integrity of the VC. 
Regarding driver (b), we have already analysed the anonymous feature. We have 
discussed that it is not an absolute anonymity but rather a pseudo-anonymity61. Users 
need to take additional measures if they want to stay anonymous. 
VC is a new transnational/cross border concept that imposes challenges for national 
jurisdictions. This is showed on driver (c) due to the fact that VCs work exclusively on 
the Internet, independently of the geographic location of the users. The global reach 
demands cooperation and coordination from different States so that regulatory goals can 
be achieved effectively. This has already been pointed out by the US Government 
Accountability Office that stated that that “law enforcement may have to rely on 
cooperation from international partners to conduct investigations, make arrests, and seize 
criminal assets.”62   
Drivers (d), (e), (f) and (l) all mention the lack of standards, especially the lack of 
oversight of business that gravitate around VC, like exchange or trading platforms, which 
can have a negative impact on the market and consumers. 
We have already discussed driver (g) when we analysed the “certainty of payment”, 
concluding that there are benefits and risks associated to the irreversibility of transactions. 
It is evident that Driver (j) is of the utmost importance for the confidence of users in VCs 
although, we believe that it is so for different reasons than the ones present by EBA. There 
is no report of any of the major VC protocols to have been compromised to this date. 
However, there is a big number of VCs getting stolen from users’ accounts. The most 
notable example was Mt. Gox. This company was the biggest bitcoin exchange platform 
in 2013, handling 70% of all transaction of bitcoins. In April 2014 it filled bankruptcy 
protection after announcing that 850 000 bitcoins, evaluated around 450 million dollars, 
                                                          
60 Vankenburgh, Peter and Jerry Brito. State Digital Currency … cit. page 9. 
61 In chapter 2. c: Anonymity of the participants vs Publicity of transaction in the “block chain”. 
62 New York State Department of Financial Services, Title 23 Chapter I, Regulations of the 
Superintendent of Financial Services, Part 200 Virtual Currencies, cit. page 22. 
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were stolen by hackers (even though it was never clear if all the amount was really stolen 
or if the users were subjected to fraud)63. This shows the negative impact that the lack of 
a strong IT safety has on the network.  
Driver (k) refers to information problems on VC markets, partially due to the technical 
complexity of this technology. This can act as deterrence for people to trust VCs. 
Since there is no regulation, companies that operate with VC do not have capital 
requirements. This means they are unprepared to deal with users’ compensation and other 
creditors in case of bankruptcy. This is linked to drivers (l) and (o). Once again, Mt Gox 
can be used as an example since, after filing for bankruptcy, the users of this exchanger 
were left without any compensation. They only had access to the accounts to check their 
balance64.  
The lack of separation between accounts, driver (m), can be problematic in case of 
bankruptcy. 
Driver (n) is also a direct result of the lack regulation in the sector. Consumers do not 
have an accessible and effective way to complain if they feel their rights were violated. 
Companies working with VC are not obliged to adopt any governance mechanism or 
accountability schemes. Driver (p) is special relevant if we take into account that most 
companies using VCs are actually start-ups, with little experience hence this industry is 
so recent. 
Driver (q) and driver (t) are linked as they both refer to the lack of an authority with 
powers to act upon suspicious transactions. 
Driver (r) refers to the impact that VC, being a bidirectional flow scheme, can have on 
FC schemes and on the traditional economy. Nowadays, this problem may have little 
since the total capital market of bitcoin $ 5,671,050,56265, which may seem small 
knowing that this is a worldwide phenomenon. However, this problem can become real 
in a couple of years if VC continues to grow. 
                                                          
63Vigna, P. (2014), 5 things about Mt. Gox’s crisis, The Wall Street Journal, 25 February: and The 
Troubling Holes in MtGox's Account of How It Lost $600 Million in Bitcoins, MIT Technology Review, 
4 April 2014. 
64 Williams, R. (2014), MtGox returns to allow users to check Bitcoin balance, The Telegraph, 18 March. 
65 Last seen on November 8, 2015: http://coinmarketcap.com/ 
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Finally, we have already debated driver (s) when we debated VC definition66. 
Regulatory approach 
After analyzing the risks and benefits of VCs, the EBA report concludes with the potential 
long and short term regulatory approach. 
For the long term EBA suggests: 
 Scheme governance authority 
 Customer due diligence (CDD) requirements 
 Fitness and probity standards 
 Mandatory incorporation 
 Transparent price formation and requirements against market abuse 
 Authorization and corporate governance 
 Capital requirements 
 Separation of client accounts 
 Evidence of secure IT systems 
 Payment guarantee and refunds 
 Separation of VC scheme from conventional payment systems 
 Miscellaneous requirements 
 Clear and transparent regulation 
 A global regulatory approach 
 Risks drivers that remain deliberately unaddressed 
A few notes on the most relevant of these suggestions. 
EBA starts by suggesting the creation of a “scheme governance authority” which would 
be responsible for the scheme’s integrity and act as the supervisor of the network. This 
would be a direct contradiction to the spirit of decentralized VCs. EBA justifies its 
position by claiming that this central entity will not jeopardize the decentralized feature 
since this entity would not be responsible for issuing the currency, but only act as the 
financial clearing house. However, we argue that EBA belittles the negative effect that 
would have on the users, since it would destroy one of the benefits of VCs: the limited 
interference by the public authorities. After browsing for hours through endless online 
                                                          
66 In chapter 2. c: It does not have the status of legal tender 
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forums and threads, one cannot avoid to conclude that the users feel somehow empowered 
and responsible for the destiny of the different VCs schemes. A measure like this would 
have a negative impact on that feeling, decreasing it. It is important to bear this in mind 
when drafting regulation form VCs as their strength is deeply connected with the trust 
their supporters have on them. 
Secondly, EBA suggests “costumer due diligence” requirements on exchange and VC 
business. This measure would also collide with the anonymity feature, since the user of 
those market participants would be obliged to share personal information. However, we 
believe that this measure would not affect so negatively the network since users that 
would still want to preserve their anonymity could avoid those third parties and still be 
part of the network. This would be an active measure to fight money laundry since the 
users interested in exchanging VC for FC will always need to resort to the services of an 
exchanger. 
Next suggestion is the establishment of fitness and probity standards on individuals and 
market participants relevant to the scheme. This test of suitability would be important to 
avoid cases like the Mt. Gox, where the largest exchanger in the world went bankrupt, 
which reveals a lack of quality governance. In the same way, “authorization and corporate 
governance” would help strengthen and stabilize companies that provide VC services. 
Furthermore, EBA suggests “mandatory incorporation in an EU member state” as a legal 
person for market participants (e.g. exchangers) so that they can be accountable for their 
actions. This is an important step for consumer protection and overall market stability, 
although we believe we should not limit business to be incorporated only on EU member 
states. We believe that EBA should broaden the list to include other States that offer 
guaranties of persecution in case of crimes or other unlawful conduct from the VC 
business (such as the United States, for example). The goal is to oblige VC businesses to 
be incorporated and operate in jurisdiction that can make them accountable for their 
actions. 
EBA clarifies that “transparent price formation and requirements” would fight obscure 
price formation, focusing on enforcing exchanges requirements to prevent insider dealing 
and market manipulation. However, we cannot perceive how this would operate in 
practice. One may argue that the price formation is already a clear process, since it is 
28 
 
mainly based on demand and supply and that any type of regulation on this matter would 
actually only have a negative impact on the price formation. 
The establishment of “Capital requirements” is also an EBA suggestion and considering 
the history of bankruptcy in VC, it would strengthen companies that hold VC for their 
users. The capital should be held in FC so that it is not susceptible to VCs volatility. 
Additional, EBA suggest the establishment “Evidence of secure IT” is extremely 
important in an industry that works exclusively on the Internet. This is important for every 
market participant, but mostly for companies that hold their users’ VC, and so, are in a 
position of trust. 
The “payment guarantee and refunds” will contradict one of the characteristics of most 
VCs nowadays, irreversibility of payments. To overcome this barrier that is inherent to 
most VC protocols, EBA suggests three alternative proxies: one that would make the 
merchant have a deposit amount with that proxy that would be used to reverse 
transactions, if needed; another, where the proxy would send an “unbaked IOU 
document”67, but that would only go through the payment after it had been cleared; lastly, 
the proxy would receive the payment and only forward it to the merchant after the 
customers had received their part of the transaction. This measure would only be applied 
to transactions with merchants, and as EBA states “effectiveness of each approach would 
require further assessment”. 
“Separation of VC schemes from conventional payment systems” aims at minimizing the 
impact of VC on the traditional financial system. Therefore, it would require existing 
regulated financial institutions to create different entities to provide VC services. 
Further adding to list, EBA has “miscellaneous requirements” where it includes all the 
standards that would be demanded from market participators in terms of governance, 
complain mechanism, reports to a superintendent and disclosure. 
EBA acknowledges that the global nature of VC demands a global action: international 
coordination is necessary to achieve a “successful regulatory regime”.  
For the short term, EBA’s suggestion differs from the long term one. It is not a list of 
suggestions that addresses the risk drives. Instead, it makes only two suggestions to 
                                                          
67A document that would acknowledge the debt to the merchant (IOU = I owe you). 
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address the drives arising from the interaction between VC and the traditional financial 
system. 
Firstly, it recommends national supervisors to discourage current and regulated financial 
institutions to interact with VC (buying, holding or selling VC). 
Secondly, it recommends that EU legislators apply the anti-money laundering and counter 
terrorist financing requirements from the EU Anti Money Laundering Directive to VC 
exchanges. 
They further add that extend current financial regulation to VC business would lend them 
credibility that they do not deserve, since they cannot be quite compared to traditional 
payment services or other financial institutions. 
For the above, it is clear that, for the short-term, EBA advocates for a “wait and see” 
stand. It is the realization that a hasty regulation can be more negative than positive. In 
its own words: “this immediate response will allow VC schemes to innovate and develop 
outside of the financial services sector”. VCs still have a small impact on world economy, 
first of all because they are not very well-known by the general public yet, as 
consequence, and in this development stage, heavy regulation can asphyxiate it. We also 
highlight the fact that EBA leaves prohibition out of its regulatory approach. 
 
b. United Kingdom  
Her Majesty Treasury made a report, “Digital currencies: response to the call for 
information”, aiming at “looking into the benefits and risks associated with digital 
currencies and underlying technology, with a particular focus on the question of 
regulation”68. Therefore this report is of most importance for anyone studying VC from 
a regulatory point of view. Any sharp reader has already realized that the UK has decided 
to use the “Digital” denomination over “Virtual”; however, this must not be of any 
confusion after reading the second chapter, since we know that we are still talking about 
the same digital representation of value. 
Early in the introduction, the report states that “the government wishes to foster a 
supportive environment for the development of legitimate businesses in the digital 
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currency sector so that UK can see some of the benefits of digital currencies, while also 
creating a hostile environment for illegal activity.”69 So, the UK government shows a 
positive attitude towards VC, realizing that even if VC can be used, as they also are, for 
illegal activities, there are benefits worth exploring. The reports reveal not an intention to 
ban VC, but rather develop their legitimate business. 
It also does a Benefits/Risk analysis to understand where the potential of this technology 
lies, and where regulation should act to avoid the dangers. That analysis is quite similar 
to the one done by EBA: low transaction fees, allowing micropayments; no need to 
exchange personal information; transparency of the blockchain; financial inclusion 
(mostly for countries lacking banking structures). They also dedicate a specific chapter 
just to analyze the potential of the blockchain technology that can be applied to any case 
where keeping a record is needed. 
Then the report lists the “barriers to digital currency firms”. Those being “the lack of a 
regulatory framework for digital currencies”, “uncertainty negatively impacts business”; 
and “difficulties in opening bank accounts in the UK”, which can be linked to the first 
(banks do not want to work with VC companies because they are not reliable) or banks 
see in VC companies a competitive threat. 
On the side of risks, the report starts with the crime risk. As we said before, the anonymity 
factor and the fact VCs operates outside the government scope potentiates criminal 
activities. The following is the risk to users, mainly the risk of being hacked and being 
deprived of their VCs or losing them on a bankruptcy case like the one of Mt. Gox. 
Finally, the last risk identified is the monetary and financial stability. It considers it a low 
level risk because of the current small volume of transactions around the world. 
After the benefits/risk analysis, the report finishes with the “Conclusion and next steps”. 
In this chapter, the report explores the measures that the government is going to 
implement to deal with the risks of VCs. Firstly, to address the criminal use, “the 
government intends to apply anti-money regulation to digital currency exchange”70. It 
also intends to empower law enforcement bodies to able them to identify and persecute 
criminal activity, “including the ability to seize and confiscate digital currency funds 
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where transactions are for criminal purposes.”71 Secondly, to address the consumer 
protection issues, UK wants to create a “framework for best practice standards”. This 
light way approach aims at raising consumer protection without creating too many costs 
of compliance which can suffocate young start-ups that populate the VC industry. Lastly, 
the report announces a government research initiative of £10 million in this area in 
addition to the research set by the Bank of England that is already in place, seeking the 
possibility of creating a “central bank-run system”.  
We can conclude that the UK is really committed to developing a safe environment for 
VC to develop and to collect its benefits. It is the first European country taking a major 
position in favour of developing VC. However, outside Europe there is a country that 
went even further: the United States of America. 
 
c. New York’s Bitlicense 
The United States has been leading VCs regulation. On June 3, 2015, the New York 
Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) issued “BitLicense”, the first piece of 
financial regulation on VCs.  
It is divided into the following sections: introduction; definitions; license; application; 
application fees; action by superintendent; compliance; capital requirements; custody and 
protection of customer assets; material changes to business; change of control; merger 
and acquisitions; book and records; examinations; reports and financial disclosures; anti-
money laundering program; cyber security program; business continuity and disaster 
recovery; advertising and marketing; consumer protection; complaints; transitional 
period and severability 
This piece of legislation “contains regulations relating to the conduct of business 
involving Virtual Currency”72. Therefore, the first conclusion one can take is that NY 
State did not aim at regulating everything related with VCs, but just VCs’ business. We 
shall understand exactly what that means and the problems related with that description. 
This regulation defines VCs business activities as a group of activities such as: 
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Superintendent of Financial Services, Part 200 Virtual Currencies, Section 200.1 Introduction. 
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 “receiving Virtual Currency for Transmission or Transmitting Virtual Currency, 
except where the transaction is undertaken for non-financial purposes and does 
not involve the transfer of more than a nominal amount of Virtual Currency; 
 storing, holding, or maintaining custody or control of Virtual Currency on behalf 
of others; 
 buying and selling Virtual Currency as a customer business; 
 performing Exchange Services as a customer business; or 
 controlling, administering, or issuing a Virtual Currency.” 
We can see that miners are left out of this regulation. Businesses that act as trusty 
intermediaries are the ones covered by Bitlicense. The ones who “walk and quack like a 
money transmitting duck”73.  
Coin Center criticizes this choice of wording since it is believed to be misleading. Firstly, 
they are strong supporters of the term “Digital” over “Virtual” as we have already pointed 
out. Secondly, they argue that “business activities” suggest that all businesses 
surrounding VCs are covered by this regulation when, in fact, it is only the ones related 
with “transmitting money”. So, they conclude that “digital currency transmission” would 
be a more appropriated wording to describe those covered by this regulation. 
They further criticize the NY department choice of determining who shall apply to the 
license by saying that “the determination of which business warrant regulation and which 
do not should be made by reference to what harm the business is capable and incapable 
of doing, rather than whether they “hold” or “store” units of digital currency”74. This 
means that the businesses that have access to their costumers’ VCs, and therefore are in 
special trust position, are the ones that need regulation. 
Although we agree that “virtual currency business activities” is not the best expression 
to determine which businesses needs to apply for this license, the enumeration quoted 
above clarifies that it is the businesses in position of trust in their relation with the 
customers that need to apply. 
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There is a second tier to determine who is covered by this regulation, which is the relation 
with the State of New York. Nevertheless, we are not going to analyze the problem 
relating to this requirement, since we feel it is not relevant for our work. 
In an overview of the Bitlicense75 we outline three main areas of this regulation, namely 
Consumer Protection; Anti-Money Laundering (AML); Cyber Security. One may argue 
that those are the reasons why the regulation was created in first place76. Parallel to these 
areas, we also take a look at other important aspects of this regulation. 
Starting with Consumer Protection, section 200.19 is entirely dedicated to it. 
Additionally, other rules throughout the diploma can be labelled as consumer protection 
rules. 
The first aspect to point out is the relevance given to disclosure. VCs business under 
Bitlicense have high standards for disclosure that go from the terms and conditions of the 
products and services offered, to the risks associated with use of VCs (not having legal 
status, irreversibility of transaction, volatility, so on and so forth). 
Secondly, businesses need to establish an efficient complaint mechanism that allows 
consumers to be heard and have their problems addressed in a timely manner. Also, it is 
required that the licensee has a written anti-fraud policy, although it is not crystal clear – 
and it should–, it is stated that “each licensee shall take reasonable steps to detect and 
prevent fraud”.  
Outside the section 200.19, but still in the area of consumer protection, this regulation 
also demands from the licensees a written policy on how to deal with complains. 
Advertisement and marketing are also restricted to protect costumers. Each licensee needs 
to keep their ads for at least seven years for examination by the superintendent seeking 
for false or misleading advertising. 
Anti-Money Laundry measures are the following main group of requirements we will 
overview. Bitlicense requires a comprehensive AML program77: 
                                                          
75 Because we do not have enough space to thoroughly go through every section. 
76New York’s BitLicense: Discussion with Davis Polk, Hosted by Digital Currency Group, cit. page 4. 
77 POLK Kew York’s Final “BitLicense” Rule: Overview and changes from July 2014 Proposal, cit. 
pages 41 and 42. 
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 Risk Assessment (one initial assessment and, at least, additional annual risk 
assessments); 
 Compliance Function (need for intern controls, designated AML compliance 
officer, for example); 
 Audit Function (internal and external audition that must be submitted to NYDFS); 
 Prohibitions (of relation with shell companies that have no country, of purposely 
conceal the identity of costumers or evading report duties); 
 Records (licensee need to keep records for at least 7 years, details of what this 
records should include are also specified); 
 Reports (of suspicious transactions and all the transactions of the equivalent to 
over $10,000); 
 Office of Foreign Assets Control Compliance (costumers need to be checked 
against the special designated nationals list of this office); 
 Customer Identification Program (effective Know Your Costumer polices need to 
be in place). 
Next, Cybersecurity is truly relevant with VCs, more than other banking or payment 
services that use online products, since they are a digital representation of value (just ones 
and zeros on a computer) they are more susceptible to hackers’ attacks. Recent history, 
namely Mt Gox case, shows that cyber security is central for a VC businesses 
sustainability. 
Therefore, Bitlicense got a whole section on cybersecurity, section 200.16. Here, we do 
not find technical requirements that the licensees need to respect. Instead, it refers to the 
core functions and areas that the cybersecurity system needs to act upon. They need to 
have security programmes that effectively identify and react to risk, to respond and 
recover form security events; they also need to implement a written policy about 
procedures to protection of its electronic systems, detailing for example customer data 
privacy, business continuity and disaster recovery planning and resources or access 
controls. Also, the same as in AML programme, a Chief Information Security Officer has 
to be appointed in order to implement and respond for the security of the business. There 
is also a number of functions that are needed to be included in audit, and requirements to 
the employees’ qualification on this matter. 
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Outside this main area there are other requirements typical from a financial business. 
Reports and financial disclosures, for example, despite being part of the AML program 
as regards the reports of suspicious transaction, are boarder and demanding. VC 
businesses have the obligation of keeping the superintendent updated of their financial 
wealth. Section 200.14 imposes quarterly and annually financial statements to be 
submitted by the licensee; an assessment of compliance with laws and regulations; the 
need for notification to the superintendent of criminal action or insolvency proceeding 
against the licensee.  
Capital requirements are also part of this regulation and can be seen both as consumer 
and creditor protection. There is no established capital requirement. Instead, it must be 
determined by the superintendent based on the licensee risk profile. This regulation lists 
some of the factors that superintendents must take into account when determining it, like 
compositions of assets and liabilities, volume of activities, amount of leverage, among 
others. It also determines that this capital requirement must be hold in the form of cash, 
VC or high-quality and high-liquid investment-grade assets. 
A final aspect deserving analysis is the application process. Any applicant must pay a 
non-refundable fee of 5 000 $ (five hundred dollars) (this is owed whether or not the 
applicant receives the license). Yet NYDFS can grant a conditional license to applicants 
that do not meet all the necessary requirements for 2 years (although it can be renewed). 
Its main aim is to allow start-ups and small businesses to adapt to the new regulation 
without overwhelming them with compliant costs78, offering a flexible environment to 
these companies. 
It is easy to draw comparison with this piece of regulation and other ones applicable to 
financial institutions like payment services. Even if you look in Europe, you can find the 
directive 2007/64/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 
on payment services in the internal market with similar capital requirements, book record 
requirement or even authorization process. However, VCs particularities do not let them 
fall easily into the scope of such regulation. This is argue by New York Superintendent 
of Financial Services, Benjamin Lawskys who states, regarding Bitlicense: “The rules 
also generally mirror the types of requirements that banks; financial institutions, and 
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money transmitters have to live by – with some alterations owing to the unique nature of 
virtual currencies.”79 
The economic impact of this license is only now beginning to be measured. Regulation 
brings compliance costs, and these are reportedly too heavy in the case of Bitlicense80. 
This may led to an “exodus” of start-ups out of NY. Only the time will dictates the success 
and failure of this new regulation, although it already set a premise to other regulators. 
Although this type of impact will take time to reveal, this should not impend our 
conclusion that Bitlicense is a step on the right direction.  
 
d. Towards Regulation 
Firstly, let us start by stating that regulation of VCs is inevitable. The only hypothetical 
scenario that we conceive where regulation do not occur is one where this technology 
stop to grow and eventual disappears completely. However we argue that this 
hypothetical scenario is extremely unlikely to occur taking in consideration the course of 
our tech-savvy society. Even if Bitcoin is dead tomorrow, VCs are here to stay. 
Secondly, allows us to take prohibition out of the way. Regulation should not have the 
role of stop the winds of change. A top-down approach to prohibit this technology all 
together would surely fail. The decentralized nature of VCs makes it really difficult to 
shut it down, since there is no specific entity that you can target. To prohibit a 
decentralized VC with the size of Bitcoin might as well shut down the Internet. Besides, 
probation will only renegade VC to dark side of the web, turning it into an instrument for 
illegal activity and destroying the potential benefits it may offer. Relating to the three 
pieces of work we analysed, not even EBA, which one may argue have a more 
conservative approach, defends prohibition. 
Thirdly, both EBA and the UK government recognize benefits inherent to VCs which can 
be enhance with the right regulatory approach. However, they also understand the risks 
that of this technology which need to be minimized by regulation. Nevertheless, both of 
them are quite conservative on short term measure. EBA prefers a “wait and see” position 
just recommending national supervisors to discourage current and regulated financial 
                                                          
79 Idem. 




institutions to interact with VCs and the application of anti-money laundering and counter 
terrorist financing requirements to VC exchanges. The UK government prefers a light 
approach by suggesting the creation of a framework for best practice standards. We argue 
that a different regulatory approach is needed right now so that we can truly benefit from 
VCs and that we can steer its growth away from the risks and away from its illegal usages. 
Finally, we argue that NY’s Bitlicense is a step in the right direction. Because VCs do not 
fit in our traditional legal concept and have technological particularity which make them 
truly unique compared to any other payment method, we argue that is necessary to create 
specific regulation, as NY did, and not just try to apply existing financial regulation. We 
further state that Central Banks are the financial organization that should step ahead and 
create this type of regulation on their jurisdiction. VCs business are mirror of financial 
institutions that already fall in the scope of Central Banks, so it makes sense them being 
the authorities to set VC regulation. If we take a look into Europe, we know that this is 
not the position of ECB, since it already stated that “the ECB does not see the need to 
amend or expand the current EU legal framework”81. Nevertheless, we stay by our 
statement also because, in the likely case of continued growth of VCs, will force 
traditional financial institutions, like banks and other payment services, to adjust to this 
new reality. Therefore it only makes sense that Central Banks begin to follow this process 
from the start. As Benjamin Lawskys put it, “My guess is that banks will eventually adjust. 
(…)And they will probably co-opt or acquire some of the most promising technology after 
a period of trial and error. Regulators, for their part, will have to keep up and find ways 
to permit innovation and improvements (…)”82.  
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Throughout this thesis, we review the current framework VC from a regulatory 
standpoint. But where we stay regarding our research question: Where should regulation 
start in order to create a healthy environment for innovation, while protecting the 
traditional financial system and fight illegal activities? 
So, as we mention above, prohibition is not an option, therefore we stand aside the UK 
government wishes of “foster a supportive environment for the development of legitimate 
businesses in the digital currency sector (…) while also creating a hostile environment 
for illegal activity.”83 Regulation, therefore, need to find a balance between being 
supportive of innovation and disproving of illegal activities. Institution must be conscious 
that regulation imposes costs on market participants, but also introduces confidence in 
the system and in the general public. In addition, a deep, board and heavy regulation, at 
this point of early development, could likely destroy this technology. 
So which market participants should regulation target?  
Finished the overview of EBA’s Opinion on VCs, UK call for evidence and NY’s 
Bitlicense we can conclude that some market participants are constantly left outside the 
regulatory impetus. They are the users, the merchants and the miners. These are all 
participants that should not be regulated since they are intrinsic to the system. Without 
them there is no VC. We need users to hold and spend them, we need miners to validate 
the transactions and create more coins and we need merchants willing to accept them as 
mean of payment so that they can have value, otherwise they worthless. Being core to the 
system, any regulation will deeply disrupt the essence of VCs. This kind of impact is 
definitely not welcome since will change the DNA of the technology. 
Therefore we need to look to the extrinsic market participants. Most of the risks identified 
by EBA materialize on VCs businesses that make the contact point between the virtual 
world and the traditional financial world. In alignment with this, the majority of its 
regulatory approach are aiming for this type of businesses. They are the businesses that 
put themselves in a position of trust regarding their customers, holding and storing VCs 
in their name and facilitating its transmission. This is also the aim of NY’s Bitlicense, and 
we argue that it must be the first step of a successful regulation. Businesses like 
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exchangers or wallet providers (and others with similar characteristics) should be the first 
subjects of regulation.  
We argue that regulation should focus on three main areas: (i) Anti-money laundry 
requirements; (ii) consumer protection, and (iii) Technological requirements or 
Cybersecurity. Once again, in line with Bitlicense. 
AML requirements are of the most important aspect since money laundry is one of the 
main threats for VCs credibility, and its main illegal use. 
Costumer protection should also be central at any regulation at this point so that cases 
like Mt Gox are not repeated. If businesses like exchanges platform are in a position of 
trust relative to their customers, they should implement mechanisms to protect that trust. 
Finally, cybersecurity is fundamental for any Internet base technology. Hackers that 
access and steal VCs are one of the worst enemies to the progress of this technology. 
In conclusion, it is too early to put VCs into a box. What VCs are today, are not 
necessarily what it will be tomorrow: “If we conceive of bitcoins simply as tokens, then 
other applications become apparent. For example, we could agree that a particular bitcoin 
(or, indeed, an infinitesimally small fraction of a bitcoin so as to allow for many tokens) 
represents a house, a car, a share of stock, a futures contract, or an ounce of gold”84. 
Therefore excessive regulation can limited what this technology can become. We should, 
in alignment with UK government convictions, have a regulatory approach that aims to 
create a fertile field so that they can grow. Like a wild animal on protected wild reserve, 
VC need to feel free enough to develop their full potential, since they are, by nature, anti-
institutional and anti-supervision but regulation should act on the border between this 
wild reserve and the real world to minimize negative impacts. 
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